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Abstract  
Combining the classical “push-pull factors” and the “Lucas paradox” 
theoretical approaches, and taking into account the relationship between 
components of capital flows  -through Three Stage Least Square (3SLS) 
estimations-, this paper shows that physical infrastructure and financial 
development positively affect Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and portfolio 
investment in developing countries. The analysis highlights the importance of non-
linearity effects when assessing the role of financial development for portfolio 
investment inflows. Lax monetary policy and excessive credit provision could 
weaken the financial system and significantly reduce portfolio investment flows. 
The results also show that for Sub-Saharan African countries, better physical 
infrastructure tends to attract more FDI.  
 
 
Keywords: Foreign Direct Investment, Portfolio Investment, Physical Infrastructure, Financial 
Development, Three Stage Least Squares.  
 
 
 
 
*65 Boulevard François Mitterrand 63000 Clermont-Ferrand, France.  
E-mail: Tidiane.Kinda@u-clermont1.fr 
 
The author would like to acknowledge Jean-Louis Combes, Patrick Plane and anonymous 
referees for comments and suggestions. The author is also grateful for comments from CERDI 
seminar participants and 3rd Izmir University of Economics conference participants, Money, 
Macro, Finance 39th annual conference participants and 56th French Economic Association 
(AFSE) annual conference participants. 
2 
 
1. Introduction  
According to the neoclassical economic theory -assuming free capital markets and 
diminishing returns-, capital should flow from capital abundant countries (developed 
countries) to capital scarce countries (developing countries) leading to the equalization of 
marginal returns to capital. In reality, this theoretical prediction is not observed, leading to 
an important paradox in international macroeconomics: the “Lucas paradox”. Private 
capital flows are important in financing development, especially in the context of 
insufficient and unstable aid, which makes it crucial to understand why the neoclassical 
theory is not observed. Why does capital not flow to developing countries where their 
marginal return is higher? Answering this question requires the study of the determinants 
of private capital flows. For foreign private capital, we consider net flows of FDI, 
portfolio investments and debts.  
Following the Asian crisis, a number of studies on the determinants of private capital 
flows emerged. These studies were generally based on an approach that distinguishes 
between external determinants (exogenous to the economy receiving capital, or “push 
factors”) and internal determinants1 (under the recipient economy’s control, or “pull 
factors”). The analysis of external factors explains how the economic conditions of 
capital-exporting countries (developed countries) influences capital inflows in developing 
countries. These external factors reflect the opportunity cost of investment in these 
countries. The international interest rate and world growth rates, generally approximated 
by those of the United States, are the most influential factors. Low profit in developed 
countries is a significant cause of capital flows to developing countries where profits’ 
prospects can be more promising. One of the first analyzes of private capital flows 
determinants was made by Calvo, Leiderman and Reinhart (1993). Using a sample of 10 
Latin American countries over the period 1988-1991, they find that capital flows are 
                                                 
1 Studies also focus on contagion during episodes of surges in private capital flows between large countries 
and their smaller neighbours who benefit from externalities resulting from the high attractiveness of the 
large countries (Calvo et al.. 1996, Hernandez, Medallo, and Valdes 2001). A competition between 
countries of the same area for better attractiveness to private capital flows could also happen (Kang and 
al., 2003). 
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mainly influenced by the external factors, namely the growth rate and the interest rate of 
developed countries. Many authors showed the importance of the external factors 
(international interest rate and international growth rate) in determining private capital 
flows (Calvo et al., 1996; Fernandez-Arias, 1996; Montiel and Reinhart, 1999; Kim, 2000; 
Ying and Kim, 2001; Ferrucci et al., 2004). A greater number of studies revealed the 
dominant role of internal factors (macroeconomic conditions of the recipient country) in 
the explanation of private capital inflows (Root and Ahmed, 1979; Schneider and Frey, 
1985; Fernandez-Aria, 1996; Ahn et al., 1998; Gastanga et al., 1998; Asiedu, 2002). 
Internal factors are the macroeconomic conditions of the recipient country that influence 
private capital flows to this country. A stable macroeconomic environment is favourable 
to investment decisions, creation of value added, and productivity. Internal factors include 
economic growth rate, inflation, trade openness, education, and political stability, which 
can be influenced by national-level policies. Studies that are more recent use the “Lucas 
paradox” to explain the determinants of private capital flows2. Following Lucas, these 
studies differentiate the determinants of capital flows into economic fundamentals with 
the ability to affect the production structure (education, institutions, and so forth) and 
capital market imperfections (mainly informational asymmetry). Alfaro et al. (2006a, 
2006b), through a cross-sectional study, find that the “Lucas paradox” is explained by the 
quality of institutions, education, inflation and financial development. According to 
Reinhart and Rogoff (2004), the “Lucas paradox” exists because of political risk and 
credit market imperfections. Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) argue that the reduction of credit 
market imperfections through better institutions would allow externalities, in particular 
those related to the human capital, to play a more significant role. Recent studies also 
illustrated the importance of business environment for private capital flows (Martin and 
Rose-Innes, 2004; Asiedu, 2006; Naudé and Krugell, 2007; Bénassy-Quéré et al. 2007; 
IMF, 2007; IMF, 2008). 
                                                 
2 A very recent approach, applied to emerging countries, consists in the estimation of a model of supply 
and demand of capital flows. Then using the maximum likelihood method, this approach estimates the 
probability of disequilibrium between supply and demand of capital (Mody and Taylor, 2004). 
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All of these studies lead to different conclusions about the factors which significantly 
influence private capital inflows to a country. Another crucial element to attracting FDI is 
building industrial capacity. This includes developing infrastructure and human capital; 
strengthening institutional capabilities and economic openness; and promoting sound 
macroeconomic policies (low inflation, strong and sustainable economic growth). The 
purpose of this study is to extend the “Lucas paradox” approach (which considers only 
the economic fundamentals3 and capital market imperfections), by integrating external 
factors from the traditional approach (“push-pull factors”). Emphasis will be given to 
physical infrastructure and financial development that have received insufficient attention 
in the literature (especially for financial development) given the importance of their 
contribution for countries attractiveness to private capital flows. We will analyze 
aggregated private capital flows and their components. Breaking-up aggregate private 
capital flows allows the differentiation between short-term and long-term flows, which 
can have some common determinants while other factors are specific to certain flows. 
Contrary to past studies, this paper, for the first time, takes into account the relationship 
between different components of private capital and non-linearity effects of physical 
infrastructure and financial development.  
The rest of the paper is organised in two main sections: the first section analyzes the 
theoretical relation between private capital flows, physical infrastructure and financial 
development and describe a simple model based on the “Lucas paradox” approach. The 
second part of the study is devoted to the empirical analysis of the determinants of private 
capital flows followed by robustness checks. The last part concludes.  
 
 
                                                 
3 The economic fundamentals include industrial capacity main determinants. 
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2. Physical Infrastructure and Private Capital Flows 
A large number of studies (The World Bank, 1994; Temple 1999; Demurger, 2001; 
Willoughby, 2003) highlight the role of infrastructure (telecommunications, electricity, 
etc.) for economic growth and development. Beyond its direct effect on economic 
growth, infrastructure also affects growth by increasing private investment4. A greater 
availability of infrastructure increases the output of private investment by reducing 
transactions costs and enabling firms to get closer to their customers and suppliers, 
making it possible for the firms to increase their potential markets and thus their 
opportunities for profit. Well-developed telecommunications infrastructure, for example, 
can help firms to access financial resources through financial markets. Firms that do not 
have access to modern telecommunication services, reliable provision of electricity, or 
developed road systems invest less and have less productive investments (regardless of 
whether they are local or foreign). When the provision of well-functioning infrastructure 
fails, firms are sometimes forced to pay the costs of providing infrastructure themselves, 
such as electricity through power generating units, in order to continue their activities. 
This type of provision is generally more costly than traditional infrastructure provision. In 
addition to these high costs of provision, firms also support other costs due to damages 
caused by power outages. 
The determinants of FDI may vary according to their type. FDI in manufacturing, 
services or in oil, gas and mineral extraction may have different determinants. Moreover, 
variables such as infrastructure, education or inflation may have different effects 
depending on the destination of FDI. 
In previous studies, the importance of physical infrastructure in determining the 
attractiveness of foreign private capital essentially focused on FDI. Loree and Guisinger 
(1995) find that countries with developed infrastructure (measured by a multidimensional 
index of infrastructure) receive more FDI from United States. Wheeler and Mody (1992) 
and Mody and Srinivasan (1998) find similar results. Kumar (2002), with a sample of 66 
countries over 1982-1994, finds that the development of infrastructure, measured by a 
                                                 
4 See Blejer and Khan (1984), Greene and Villanueva (1991), Serven and Solimano (1993). 
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composite index, has a positive effect on FDI inflows. Ngowi (2001), Asiedu (2002) using 
a sample of African countries, and Jenkins and Thomas (2002), using a sample of 
Southern African countries, obtain similar results. The limited resources of public sector 
in developing countries, coupled with profitable opportunities in some infrastructure 
projects (electricity, telecommunications, etc.), lead to the provision of infrastructure by 
the private sector. Given the high cost of infrastructure investments, private corporations 
carrying out this type of investment are generally foreign. Sader (2000) finds that between 
1990 and 1998, 17% of FDI flows received by developing countries were directed to 
infrastructure projects. According to Ramamurti and Doh (2004), FDI financing 
infrastructure represents one third of capital inflows to developing countries in the 
beginning of the 1990s.  
3. Financial Development and Private Capital Flows 
Financial development may increase private investments due to better access of firms to 
capital5. With the emergence of financial intermediaries, financial development reduces 
transactions costs through lower informational asymmetry and better risk management 
and coverage. The reduction of informational asymmetry through financial intermediaries 
has a considerable effect on foreign capital and investments. In fact, in addition to the 
informational asymmetry supported by the local entrepreneurs, the distance between 
foreign investors and local markets generally increases this already existing information 
asymmetry. Foreign investors know neither the opportunities nor the risks of the local 
market as well as local investors do. Financial intermediaries can provide information 
about local market risks, providing more credibility to potential profit in the country. This 
stimulates the entry of new investors, in particular foreign investors, in the local market. 
Huang (2006), focuses only on domestic investment, but suggests an empirical model for 
the importance of financial development on investment. Using a sample of 43 developing 
countries over 1970-1998, he finds that financial development significantly and positively 
affects private investment. The author also concludes that private investment has a 
positive and significant effect on financial development. A developed financial sector also 
                                                 
5 See Levine (1997, 2003) for a review of the theoretical and empirical literature.  
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facilitates interactions between foreign and local firms and their suppliers and clients. The 
importance of financial intermediaries could also vary according to the type of private 
flows. Indeed, even if financial development significantly explains countries’ attractiveness 
to FDI and debts, financial intermediaries’ contribution for portfolio investments is more 
significant. Portfolio investments generally require the pre-existence of a stock market and 
thus a relatively developed financial sector. Financial development, itself, can imply the 
entry of new banks or new actors in the local market. The process of financial 
liberalization with bank privatization implies acquisitions in the form of FDI or portfolio 
investment, increasing of foreign private capital inflows. The importance of financial 
development for FDI could however be reduced with the entry of multinational banks 
which tend to follow their corporate clients. 
As mentioned by Levine (1997), studies on financial development and investments 
generally do not distinguish domestic investments from foreign investments. Focusing 
only on foreign capital, this study enriches the scarce literature on this topic. To the best 
of our knowledge, very few studies deal specifically with the effect of financial 
development on private capital flows, precisely FDI. Hausmann and Fernandez-Arias 
(2000) find that countries with the least developed capital markets tend to have more FDI 
inflows. According to the authors, FDI can be alternative financing for the firms which 
do not have access to capital markets. However, using a sample of 81 foreign firms based 
in Southern African countries, Jenkins and Thomas (2002) show that South Africa attracts 
relatively more FDI than other African countries because of its developed financial 
system. Montiel (2006), in a theoretical analysis, argues that Africa does not attract 
enough foreign private capital to finance sectors with high potential profits because of 
Africa’s human capital weakness, lack of infrastructure, and bad institutional quality. 
Montiel (2006) underlines that when African countries are relatively well endowed in 
these factors; financial underdevelopment explains their low attractiveness to foreign 
capital. 
4. The Theoretical Model 
The “Lucas paradox” is derived from a simple neoclassical growth model assuming a 
common technology to all economies. Let us consider a Cobb-Douglas production 
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function with constant return to scales, representing a small open economy in which the 
production (Y) is obtained from the combination of capital (K) and labor (L). 
Yt = At F (Kt, Lt) = At Kt α Lt1 –α      with F' (.)>0, F'' (.)<0, F(0)=0                                (1)  
A is the productivity factor and reflects the technological level which can be stock of 
human capital (Lucas, 1990). Assuming a common technological level in all economies 
and perfect capital mobility, capital will flow from most endowed economies (in capital) 
to the least endowed countries because of the property of diminishing returns. That 
would lead to a convergence and equality of the interest rates. Considering two economies 
i and j, the interest rate rt would be defined as follows: 
At f' (kit) = rt = At f' (kjt)                                                                                             (2)  
However, the prediction of interest convergence is not observed, leading to the “Lucas 
paradox”. According to Lucas, this paradox is mainly due to capital market imperfections 
(mostly informational asymmetry) and differences in economic fundamentals between 
countries, implying a difference of the technological factors (At). A could reflect for 
instance, available infrastructure, which is generally external to the firm. If i is a more 
developed country than j, then Lucas supposes that Ait is higher than Ajt which explains 
the fact that country i attracts more capital than the country j (kit > kjt) since the return of 
the capital is higher there. Giving-up the assumption of common technology between 
countries, the real return of capital becomes:  
  Ait f' (kit) > Ajt f' (kjt)                                                                                                (3)  
With more detail, equation (3) can be rewritten as followed:  
  (Ait+ Iit)f' (kit) > (Ajt+ Ijt)f' (kjt)                                                                                  (4)  
With Iit and Ijt, the infrastructure available in country i and j during the period t. Ait and Ajt 
represent other technological factors such as human capital, institutions, and 
macroeconomic conditions.  
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5. Empirical Analysis  
5.1. Data and variables  
The data cover the period 1970-2003 (subdivided into five periods of five years) and we 
retain for the regressions 58 developing countries.6 The variables for private capital flows 
are FDI, portfolio investments, debts, and private capital -defined as an aggregate of the 
three types of private capital7. For the econometric analysis, we will only retain FDI and 
portfolio investments as variables of capital inflows for several reasons. After the debt 
crisis, data on debts suffer from significant measurement errors (Alfaro et al., 2006a, 
2006b). The principal reason is the lack of data on debts existing exclusively between 
private agents (debt data used here are issued by private economic agents but can be 
contracted by private or public sector)8. These debts, contrary to the FDI and portfolio 
investments, reflect not only market incentives but also government’s decisions; the 
objective of this chapter being to analyze market incentives. After the debt crisis for 
instance, the government of developing countries contracted a significant share of private 
debt. 
                                                 
6 Central and Eastern European Countries (CEEC) are not taken into account in the regressions since the 
majority of these countries was created after 1990 whereas one of our objectives is to evaluate a 
differentiated effect before and after the 1990’s financial crises. 
7 Foreign direct investment is net inflows of investment to acquire a lasting management interest (10 
percent or more of voting stock) in an enterprise operating in an economy other than that of the investor. 
It is the sum of equity capital, reinvestment of earnings, other long-term capital, and short-term capital as 
shown in the balance of payments. Portfolio investment flows are net and include non-debt-creating 
portfolio equity flows (the sum of country funds, depository receipts, and direct purchases of shares by 
foreign investors). Bank and trade-related lending covers commercial bank lending and other private 
credits. (WDI 2005). 
8 We checked the specificity of debt compared to FDI and portfolio investments by adding to our system 
of two equations an equation of debt. The results (available upon request) show that physical and financial 
infrastructure does not increase debt inflows.  
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Since 1970, developing countries have seen three episodes of massive surge in capital 
flows9. Beyond the evolution of private capital flows, their repartition is largely unequal, 
highlighting a marginalisation of Sub-Sahara African countries.  
We use the proportion of the subscribers of fixed and mobile phone service in the 
population and the electric consumption per capita as the proxies for physical 
infrastructure. Although these variables approximate well the infrastructure available in a 
country, an addition excellent proxy for physical infrastructure would be the density of 
the road network in each country. Data missing problem do not allow the use of this last 
variable. Financial development is captured by three variables: the ratio of liquid liabilities 
to the GDP (M3/GDP), the ratio of bank credit to the private sector over the GDP, and 
the ratio of financial system deposits to the GDP. In accordance with the theoretical and 
empirical literature, we control for other important variables. Appendix 1 gives the list, 
definitions and sources of all variables.  
5.2. Estimations  
Although the objective of this chapter is not to test the existence of the “Lucas paradox,” 
but rather its explanation, it is interesting to investigate whether this paradox, so far 
established between developed and developing countries can also be observed among 
developing countries. In other words, are countries with higher income level among 
developing countries receiving more private capital flows? The results, in appendix 5, 
show that among developing countries, private capital are more directed towards 
countries with higher GDP per capita, confirming the existence of “Lucas paradox” 
among developing countries.  
The analysis of the effects of physical infrastructure and financial development on private 
capital inflows is based on the following equation. It includes capital market imperfections 
and economic fundamental variables to explain the “Lucas paradox” and variables 
                                                 
9 The general introduction (chapter 1) presents a comprehensive analysis of the trends, composition, and 
repartition of private capital flows to developing countries. 
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specific to capital exporters’ countries in accordance with the “push-pull factors” 
approach: 
jt j jt jt jt t jtCi Inf Fin Xφλ β δ λ ε+ += + + +                                                                      (1) 
Cijt, is a type i of private capital flow received by the country j in year t.  Infjt is the variable 
of physical infrastructure and Finjt the variable of financial development. Xjt is the matrix 
of the control variables. The country and time fixed effects are respectively λj and λt while 
εjt is the error term. Because our sample is only made up of developing countries, the time 
fixed effects capture external factors (“push factors”). The growth rate or the interest rate 
of the developed countries, important variables in the determination of short-term capital 
flows (particularly portfolio investments), represent common shocks to all developing 
countries that are captured by the time fixed-effects. Capital market imperfections, which 
can be approximated by the distance between countries, reflecting informational 
asymmetry (Coval and Moskowitz, 1999, 2001), are taken into account in the country 
fixed effects.  
The two equations of capital inflows could be estimated with standard fixed effect 
method. However this would suppose that the amount of the FDI received by a country 
is independent of the amount of portfolio investments received by this country (in other 
words, error terms of the two equations are not correlated). This rather restrictive 
assumption is not verified since a high number of identical variables explain the two 
components of capital flows. For instance, significant inflows of FDI in a country can 
stimulate the inflows of portfolio investments. It is thus important to consider the 
correlation of error terms that can affect the significance of the coefficients. The 
empirical model for estimation will be a system of equations as follows:  
1 1 1
2 2 2
jt j jt jt jt t jt
jt j jt jt jt t jt
FDI Inf Fin
PORT Inf Fin
X
X
φ
φ
λ β δ λ ε
λ β δ λ ε
+ +
+ +



= + + +
= + + +
                                                        (2) 
FDIjt and PORTjt represent net inflows of FDI and portfolio investments in country j in 
year t, respectively. The definition of the other explanatory variables remains identical to 
those given in equation 1. The use of Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) would be 
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more efficient than the standard fixed effect model (Arellano, 1987) since SUR takes into 
account the correlation between the errors terms. It is very likely that private capital flows 
received by a country affect its financial and physical infrastructure development. This 
potential reverse causality, as explained in the theoretical section, can be a source of 
endogeneity. In order to solve this problem, which is confirmed by the Nakamura-
Nakamura test, we define three instruments: the lagged value of physical infrastructure 
variable, the lagged value of financial development variable, and the regulation of credit 
market as financial development variable instrument.10 Instruments diagnostic with first-
stage regressions statistics (partial R², Shea partial R², partial F-test, Cragg-Donald 
Statistics) reject the hypothesis of weak instruments (table 1).  
Table 2.1 First-stage equation 
 FDI Portfolio I. 
Excluded Instruments Telephone M3/GDP Telephone M3/GDP 
Telephone_1 2.010 -0.133 2.010 -0.136 
 (26.81)*** (0.72) (26.72)*** (0.73) 
M3/GDP_1 -0.015 0.549 -0.015 0.548 
 (0.60) (9.12)*** (0.61) (9.08)*** 
Regulation -0.041 0.841 -0.041 0.839 
 (0.21) (1.76)* (0.21) (1.75)* 
Weak instruments diagnostics 
 Shea Partial R²  0.83 0.33 0.83 0.33 
Partial R² 0.83 0.33 0.83 0.33 
Partial F 268.19 27.72 266.41 27.49 
          p-values 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 Cragg-Donald F stat.                    27.66                    27.42 
 Stock and Yogo Critical values 
        10%                    13.43                    13.43 
        15%                    8.18                    8.18 
       20%                   6.40                   6.40 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
For the estimations, we use three stage least squares (3SLS) which, like two stage least 
squares (2SLS), deals with the endogeneity problem but also takes into consideration the 
correlation between the errors terms of the equations like SUR method. Under the null 
assumption of good specification of all equations in the model, 3SLS is more efficient 
                                                 
10 This variable of credit market regulation indicates governments’ constraints or incentives in term of 
control of interest rates on deposits and bank loans. An instrument for financial development, commonly 
used in the literature is the legal origin. This instrument cannot be used in our case since it is already 
included in the country fixed effects. 
13 
 
since it deals with the correlation of different equations’ error terms. However, when at 
least one equation in the system is misspecified, this misspecification extends to all 
systems by the correlation of error terms, leading to biased and less consistent 
coefficients. In this case, the 2SLS estimator, although less efficient, is preferable since 
there is no correlation in error terms and it is consistent, even in the case of the 
misspecification of one equation in the system. Although results obtained by the 2SLS do 
not differ significantly (appendix 8), a Hausmann test confirms the preference for 3SLS.  
5.3. Results   
We first consider an index of physical and financial infrastructure obtained with principal 
components analysis that avoids colinearity problems between infrastructure variables. A 
second method of aggregation used is the standardisation of variables. This method is 
similar to principal component analysis but it gives an equivalent weight to each variable 
in the calculation of the index. The indexes include five variables: the proportion of 
subscribers of fixed and mobile phone, the electric consumption per capita, the ratio 
M3/GDP, the credit to private sector, and the deposits in financial institutions. The 
following table gives the results of estimations with aggregated indexes. 
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Table 2.2: Estimation with physical and financial infrastructure index 
 Dependent Variables 
 Private 
capital 
FDI Portfolio I. Private 
capital 
FDI Portfolio 
I. 
Explanatory 
Variables 
2SLS 3SLS 3SLS 2SLS 3SLS 3SLS 
Infrastructure1 0.541 0.331 0.189    
 (2.56)** (1.87)* (2.04)**    
Infrastructure2    0.283 0.205 0.070 
    (2.88)*** (2.48)** (1.62) 
Control -1.289 -1.050 -0.127 -1.222 -0.982 -0.128 
 (2.38)** (2.31)** (0.53) (2.28)** (2.18)** (0.54) 
Growth 0.193 0.167 0.056 0.189 0.171 0.048 
 (3.73)*** (3.93)*** (2.46)** (3.84)*** (4.24)*** (2.23)** 
Inflation -0.000 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 
 (0.80) (2.18)** (1.72)* (1.02) (2.29)** (1.44) 
Openness -0.716 -0.390 -0.584 -0.695 -0.578 -0.395 
 (0.69) (0.45) (1.28) (0.72) (0.71) (0.92) 
Education -0.004 -0.004 0.001 -0.002 -0.002 0.001 
 (0.33) (0.36) (0.21) (0.18) (0.22) (0.28) 
Property -0.041 -0.061 0.010 -0.035 -0.063 0.017 
 (0.41) (0.73) (0.24) (0.36) (0.75) (0.38) 
Natural 
resources 
-0.103 -0.084 0.013 -0.098 -0.079 0.013 
 (0.71) (0.69) (0.20) (0.68) (0.65) (0.20) 
Crisis -0.708  -0.152 -0.705  -0.148 
 (3.21)***  (1.58) (3.25)***  (1.57) 
R2 0.69 0.74 0.22 0.70 0.75 0.24 
Sargan Stat.  0.01 0.28 0.53 0.02 0.06 0.49 
(p-value) (0.95) (0.40) (0.53) (0.89) (0.19) (0.52) 
Observations 197 197 197 197 197 197 
Countries 45 45 45 45 45 45 
z statistics in parentheses. 
All regressions include time and country fixed effects. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
1 Infrastructure index by principal component analysis 
2 Infrastructure index by standardization 
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Before interpreting the results obtained with the infrastructure index, we separately 
estimate the equations with individual variables of infrastructure in order to address 
criticisms generally made to aggregate indicators that cannot distinguish the partial 
contribution of each variable. The following table gives the results of estimations 
considering a proxy for physical infrastructure (the proportion of fixed and mobile phone 
subscribers) and another one for financial development (M3/GDP) separately.  
Table 2.3: Estimation (3SLS) with differentiation of physical and financial 
infrastructure  
 Dependent Variables 
Explanatory Variables FDI Portfolio I. 
Telephone 0.031 -0.006 
 (2.53)** (0.92) 
M3/GDP -0.016 0.017 
 (1.06) (2.10)** 
Control -1.080 -0.083 
 (2.65)*** (0.40) 
Growth 0.084 0.048 
 (2.29)** (2.52)** 
Inflation -0.002 0.000 
 (3.73)*** (1.87)* 
Openness 1.286 -0.532 
 (1.65)* (1.32) 
Education -0.003 0.001 
 (0.34) (0.22) 
Property -0.008 0.009 
 (0.11) (0.23) 
Natural resources -0.079 0.015 
 (0.94) (0.35) 
Crisis  -0.128 
  (1.55) 
R2 0.88 0.19 
Sargan Stat. 0.14 0.29 
(p-value) (0.29) (0.41) 
Observations 239 239 
Countries 58 58 
z statistics in parentheses. 
All regressions include time and country fixed effects. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Beside the instrument diagnostic tests which reject the hypothesis of weak instruments, 
the Sargan overidentification test does not reject the validity of the instruments. Control 
variables have almost identical effects when considering the index of infrastructure or 
individual variables of infrastructure and financial development. The macroeconomic 
instability, characterised by a high inflation or a banking crisis negatively affects FDI and 
portfolio investments respectively (table 2.2). Inflation positively affects portfolio 
investment. This result could illustrate the fact that Latin American countries, which 
attract an important part of portfolio investment in the sample, have higher inflation, 
particularly during the Mexican crisis of 1994. Capital controls11 have a negative effect on 
private capital inflows and a good economic performance characterised by a high growth 
rate positively influences private flows. Countries that are more open also receive more 
FDI.12  
Concerning the two variables of interest, the index of physical and financial infrastructure, 
either obtained by the principal components analysis or by the standardisation method, 
positively and significantly affects private capital flows and each of its components (FDI 
and portfolio investments). Physical and financial infrastructure have a stronger impact on 
FDI than on portfolio investments, but this result gives no indication of the respective 
                                                 
11 The measure of capital control is the average of proxies of government restrictions that affect capital 
mobility (capital account restrictions, current account restrictions, presence of multiple exchange rates and 
repatriation requirements for export proceeds). There is a structural break in capital account data series in 
1996 when the IMF started to report more details on capital account -permitting a measure of the 
intensity of capital account restriction - instead of the dichotomous variable. That makes the data before 
and after 1996 not entirely comparable. Quinn (1997) and Mody and Murshid (2005) have constructed 
single data series using the IMF publications. Chinn (2004) finds also that Quinn index explain 71 percent 
of the four variables we used to construct our index before 1996. As Mody and Murshid (2005), a 
robustness check using a truncated sample (before 1996) does not change our results.  
12 Education does not affect significantly private capital flows to developing countries. According to the 
type of FDI (vertical FDI or horizontal FDI), multinational firms will look for unskilled cheap labor or 
skilled more expensive labor force. Urata and Kawai (2000) find that skilled labor availability discourages 
Japanese FDI. After a breakdown analysis, the authors show that skilled labor positively affects FDI in 
developed countries but the effect is not significant for developing countries.  
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importance of physical or financial infrastructure in the attractivity of FDI or portfolio 
investments. Table 2.3 deals with this question by underlining the fact that physical 
infrastructure only affects FDI inflows while financial infrastructure only has a significant 
effect on portfolio investments. Indeed, a rise of 1 percentage point in the number of 
fixed and mobile phone subscribers increases FDI inflows by 0.03 percentage point. This 
result illustrates the existence of a minimal condition in order to guarantee prosperity of 
investments and thus attract FDI. A large number of economic activities (especially 
industrial ones) require a minimum of communication infrastructure (telephone, roads) 
allowing or facilitating the access to raw and intermediate materials but also the access to 
markets, reducing production costs. The government usually provides financing for 
infrastructure since firms can hardly support the cost. The existence of infrastructure thus 
creates a favourable business environment, encouraging investments, particularly foreign 
investments. 
Portfolio investments are more volatile and relatively scarce in developing countries. Of 
the two infrastructure variables, only financial development significantly and positively 
affects portfolio investment flows to developing countries. A rise of 1 percentage point of 
liquidity liabilities increases portfolio investments by 0.02 percentage point. Inflows of 
portfolio investments require a high level of financial development since this form of 
capital flow is most frequently negotiated in stock markets. By improving information 
sharing, developed financial markets reduces transaction costs and the potential risk taken 
by investors.13 
 
 
                                                 
13 The analysis shows that FDI and portfolio investments are mostly explained by identical determinants. 
It is important to pinpoint that some specific determinants of portfolio investments relate to the 
international economic situation, mainly the international interest rate and growth rate, approximated by 
those of the developed countries. As mentioned above, these important variables in the determination of 
portfolio investments are captured by time fixed-effects. 
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5.4. Robustness check and African specificity  
5.4.1. Alternative explanatory variables 
The literature suggests several variables that capture the physical infrastructure or 
financial development of a country. We considered the percentage of subscribers of fixed 
and mobile phone service in the population as a proxy for physical infrastructure and 
liquid liabilities (M3/GDP) as a proxy of financial development. The results can be 
influenced by the choice of these variables. As a robustness check, we estimate the system 
of equations with electric consumption per capita to reflect physical infrastructure and 
credit to private sector (in percentage of the GDP) as the financial development variable. 
The results are robust to the use of these alternative variables (table 2.4).  
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Table 2.4: Robustness checks (3SLS) 
 Dependent Variables 
Explanatory 
Variables 
FDI Portfolio I. FDI Portfolio I. 
Electricity 0.002 -0.000   
 (3.86)*** (1.60)   
Credit 0.098 1.644   
 (0.08) (2.58)***   
Telephone   0.036 -0.007 
   (2.80)*** (0.98) 
M3/GDP   -0.014 0.016 
   (0.93) (2.04)** 
Control -1.027 -0.259 -0.989 -0.096 
 (2.39)** (1.10) (2.38)** (0.45) 
Growth 0.138 0.062 0.088 0.048 
 (3.45)*** (2.72)*** (2.38)** (2.46)** 
Inflation -0.001 0.000 -0.002 0.000 
 (3.20)*** (2.04)** (3.67)*** (1.85)* 
Openness -0.160 -0.546 1.169 -0.518 
 (0.20) (1.25) (1.47) (1.26) 
Education 0.002 -0.001 -0.004 0.001 
 (0.17) (0.10) (0.45) (0.25) 
Property -0.052 0.028 -0.014 0.010 
 (0.66) (0.64) (0.18) (0.25) 
Natural resource -0.093 0.019 -0.083 0.016 
 (0.80) (0.30) (1.00) (0.36) 
Crisis  -0.121  -0.127 
  (1.28)  (1.54) 
Change   -0.336 0.048 
   (1.09) (0.30) 
R2 0.77 0.23 0.88 0.19 
Sargan Stat. 5.40 6.02 0.24 0.33 
(p-value) 0.98 0.98 0.37 0.44 
Observations 197 197 239 239 
Countries 45 45 58 58 
z statistics in parentheses. 
All regressions include time and country fixed effects. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Since portfolio investments are short-term flows, high variability in exchange rates could 
cause uncertainty in the return on these investments. Exchange rate variability may also 
negatively affect long-term flows such as FDI by increasing uncertainty in returns. 
Considering the exchange rate variability variable, the main results remain robust (table 
2.4). 
5.4.2. Non-linear relationship 
Up to this point, we have only tested linear relations whereas the physical infrastructure 
may have a congestion effect. Even if the number of subscribers to telephone service or 
electric consumption per capita has a positive effect on capital inflows, it would be 
possible that this positive effect vanishes above a certain level of telephone subscribers. 
For a given level of income, excessive number of telephone subscribers could illustrate 
high telecommunication cost that forces subscribers to hold one mobile phone for each 
of the main mobile companies operating in the country. This phenomenon could be 
observed in African countries such as Côte d’Ivoire or Nigeria. The interaction between 
infrastructure and other limited factors such as the stock of human capital could also 
explain the congestion effect. An increase in credit or liquid liabilities can be a signal of a 
financial development but an excessive supply of money or private credit could also 
indicate a bad management of the monetary policy or be the precursory sign of a financial 
crisis. Table 2.5 shows the results considering possible thresholds for the impact of 
infrastructure and financial development14.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
14 The Ramsey-Reset test confirms the non-linearity suspected for the variables of physical and financial 
infrastructure. 
21 
 
Table 2.5: Non linearity check (3SLS) 
 Dependent Variables 
Explanatory Variables FDI Portfolio I. 
Telephone 0.099 0.029 
 (2.04)** (1.08) 
M3/GDP 0.054 0.069 
 (1.31) (3.04)*** 
Telephone^2 -0.001 -0.000 
 (1.34) (1.07) 
M3/GDP^2 -0.001 -0.001 
 (2.03)** (3.48)*** 
Control -0.641 0.203 
 (1.38) (0.79) 
Growth 0.078 0.027 
 (2.38)** (1.47) 
Inflation -0.001 0.001 
 (1.98)** (2.56)** 
Openness 1.116 -0.084 
 (1.57) (0.22) 
Education -0.001 0.002 
 (0.12) (0.51) 
Property -0.006 0.023 
 (0.08) (0.59) 
Natural resources -0.065 0.026 
 (0.79) (0.60) 
Crisis  -0.024 
  (0.28) 
R² 0.89 0.15 
Sargan Stat.  0.41 4.85 
(p-value) (0.48) (0.97) 
Observations 239 239 
Countries 58 58 
z statistics in parentheses. 
All regressions include time and country fixed effects. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Telephone^2 and M3/GDP^2 are the squared values of Telephone and M3/GDP 
The main results are confirmed and the effects of physical and financial infrastructure on 
FDI and portfolio investment inflows become higher. Once we have allowed for non-
linearity, the results show significant a threshold effect for financial development. This 
highlights the importance of good management of the monetary policy and the negative 
impact of excessive money supply. 
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5.4.3. Structural Break and African Specificity 
Private capital inflows, particularly FDI to developing countries, have risen exponentially 
since 1990 with a peak prior to the Asian crisis (chapter 1). Important reforms in the 
liberalization of current and capital accounts were undertaken by developing countries at 
the beginning of the 1990s within the framework of the Washington Consensus in order 
to attract more private capital. A temporal Chow test before and after 1990 enables us to 
show stability of the coefficients during the two periods. There is no differentiated effect 
on the determinants of private capital due to the reforms, and no specificity before and 
after the 1990s crises.15 The analysis of private capital inflows to developing countries also 
shows a marginalisation of Sub-Saharan African countries (chapter 1). Analysis of the 
Sub-Saharan African sample shows an African specificity which is confirmed by the 
Chow test. Considering only Sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries, the results show that 
physical infrastructure positively and significantly affects FDI inflows.16  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
15 Data availability does not allow the test of other dates of potential ruptures or an Andrews-Quandt test 
that would enable to determine the break point. The choice of the break period, although imposed to us 
by the data is also justified theoretically 
16 Given the low level of portfolio investment in Sub-Saharan African countries and the fact that South 
Africa is the main destination of these portfolio investments, we consider only FDI for the estimation on 
SSA countries. The specificity of SSA countries is confirmed with the introduction of a dummy in the full 
sample. The results obtained for the SSA countries sample are similar after a standardization of the 
coefficients.  
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Table 2.6: Sub-Saharan Africa specificity (3SLS) 
 Dependent Variables 
 Total Sample Restricted Sample1  Restricted Sample1 SSA2 
 
FDI 
Portfolio 
I. 
FDI 
Portfolio 
I. 
FDI 
Portfolio 
I. 
FDI 
Telephone 0.031 -0.006 0.030 -0.009 0.099 0.029 0.043 
 (2.53)** (0.92) (2.36)** (1.44) (1.97)** (1.14) (2.31)** 
M3/GDP -0.016 0.017 -0.016 0.023 0.053 0.084 -0.030 
 (1.06) (2.10)** (1.00) (3.03)*** (1.30) (3.92)*** (1.35) 
Control -1.080 -0.083 -1.052 -0.097 -0.605 0.239 0.437 
 (2.65)*** (0.40) (2.50)** (0.49) (1.26) (0.97) (0.74) 
Growth 0.084 0.048 0.087 0.057 0.081 0.033 0.078 
 (2.29)** (2.52)** (2.31)** (3.13)*** (2.40)** (1.85)* (2.20)** 
Inflation -0.002 0.000 -0.002 0.000 -0.001 0.001 0.007 
 (3.73)*** (1.87)* (3.60)*** (2.13)** (1.93)* (2.99)*** (1.04) 
Openness 1.286 -0.532 1.220 -0.650 1.061 -0.130 2.203 
 (1.65)* (1.32) (1.52) (1.71)* (1.46) (0.35) (3.31)*** 
Education -0.003 0.001 -0.003 -0.002 -0.001 -0.000 0.013 
 (0.34) (0.22) (0.33) (0.45) (0.09) (0.01) (1.62) 
Property -0.008 0.009 -0.009 -0.011 -0.002 0.008 0.188 
 (0.11) (0.23) (0.11) (0.30) (0.02) (0.20) (1.93)* 
Natural 
resources 
-0.079 0.015 -0.078 0.023 -0.065 0.034 0.046 
 (0.94) (0.35) (0.91) (0.56) (0.77) (0.81) (0.68) 
Crisis  -0.128  -0.086  0.042  
  (1.55)  (1.09)  (0.49)  
Telephone^2     -0.001 -0.000  
     (1.30) (1.17)  
M3/GDP^2     -0.001 -0.001  
     (2.02)** (4.30)***  
R2 0.88 0.19 0.88 0.10 0.89 0.10 0.89 
Sargan Stat.  0.14 029 0.09 0.34 0.50 6.03 1.24 
(p-value) (0.29) (0.41) (0.24) (0.44) (0.52) (0.98) (0.74) 
Observations 239 239 226 226 226 226 70 
Countries 58 58 55 55 55 55 22 
z statistics in parentheses. 
All regressions include times and country fixed effects. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Telephone^2 and M3/GDP^2 are the squared values of Telephone and M3/GDP 
1 Restricted sample is the total sample without some major developing countries: Brazil, India and South Africa 
2 SSA indicates Sub-Saharan African countries 
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A rise of 1 percentage points in the number of subscribers to fixed and mobile phone 
service increases FDI inflows to SSA countries by 0.04 percentage points. These results 
may be explained by the fact that most SSA countries have a relatively low level of 
infrastructure development. On average, over the period 1970-2003, only 2 percent of the 
population in SSA countries were telephone subscribers compared to 5 percent for Asian 
countries and 12 percent for Latin America countries. A simple simulation shows that if 
SSA countries were to reach the same level of physical infrastructure development as 
Asian countries, FDI inflows would increase by 6.5 percentage points. This simulation 
reveals the importance of physical infrastructure in attracting FDI for SSA countries 
attractiveness. The estimation for the sub-sample of SSA countries also highlights the 
importance of trade openness, economic growth and property rights protection in 
increasing attractiveness for FDI. It is also important to note that the results are robust to 
potential influential countries (Brazil, India and South Africa) since these countries attract 
an important part of FDI and portfolio investments received by developing countries. 
6. Conclusion  
This chapter has analyzed the determinants of private capital flows in developing 
countries, with particular attention to physical infrastructure and financial development. 
Based on two theoretical approaches (Lucas paradox and push-pull factors) and after 
controlling for interaction between components of capital flows (with 3SLS), this study 
finds that physical infrastructure only fosters FDI inflows while financial development 
has a positive effect on portfolio investments. The results highlight the importance of 
non-linearity -particularly for financial development- in analyzing the determinants of 
foreign private capital. This indicates the importance of sound monetary policy and 
stronger oversight in the financial system. Indeed, lax monetary policy and excessive 
credit provision could weaken the financial system and significantly reduce portfolio 
investment inflows. It is thus important that policies aiming to attract more private capital 
consider also the possible negative effects such as sudden stops or reversal of short-term 
capital flows by maintaining an adequate monetary policy and improving the supervision 
and the regulation of the financial system. 
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A study of African specificity underlines the important role of physical infrastructure in 
attracting FDI inflows. Development of infrastructure should attract more private 
investments, in particular from abroad. Programs such as the NEPAD (New Partnership 
for Africa’s Development) in Africa aim to find more funds for infrastructure. This study 
encourages this type of initiative for a continent which should benefit considerably from 
the development of its infrastructure by attracting private capital, in particular FDI. 
Beyond their effects on private capital flows, the development of infrastructure also 
promotes economic growth by increasing the productivity of the economy. 
To give more credit to these findings, the next chapter will analyze deeply the 
determinants of FDI using disaggregated firm-level data in the manufacturing sector.  
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Appendices 
Appendix 2.1: List of variables 
Variables Definitions Sources 
FDI 
Foreign direct investment, net inflows (% of 
GDP) 
Global Development 
Finance (2005) PORTFOLIO I. Portfolio investment, equity (% of GDP) 
DEBT Bank and trade-related lending (% of GDP) 
M3/GDP Liquid liabilities (M3) as % of GDP 
Financial Structure 
Dataset (2006) 
Credit 
Domestic credit provided by banking sector (% 
of GDP) 
Deposit Financial System Deposits (% of GDP) 
Telephone 
Fixed line and mobile phone subscribers per 100 
inhabitants 
World Development 
Indicators (2005) 
Electricity Electric consumption per capita  
Growth Economic growth rate 
Inflation Inflation rate 
Openness 
Sum of exports and imports of goods and 
services as a share of gross domestic product 
Change Exchange rate variability (standard deviation)  
Control 
Capital control indicator : average of four 
dummies: Exchange arrangements, payments 
restrictions on current transactions and on capital 
transactions, and repatriation requirements for 
export proceeds 
Milesi Ferretti (1970-
1997) and Annual 
Report on Exchange 
Arrangement and 
Exchange 
Restrictions (1998-
2003) 
Crisis Financial crisis dummy 
Caprio and Klingebel 
(2003) 
Education Gross primary enrollment rate 
UNESCO Statistics 
(2004) 
Natural resources Log of oil, gas, metal and mineral rents World Bank (2002) 
Regulation Credit market regulation 
Fraser Institue (2005) 
Property Property right Protection 
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Appendix 2.2: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Observation Mean Standard D. Min Max 
Private capital 239 1.90 2.77 -3.32 31.72 
FDI 239 1.79 2.67 -3.32 31.72 
Portfolio I. 239 0.11 0.52 -0.78 5.82 
Telephone 239 7.80 11.94 0.06 75.46 
Electricity 197 813.87 839.78 26.20 3961.69 
M3/GDP 239 36.42 21.39 9.86 124.90 
Credit 235 0.46 0.29 0.06 1.57 
Deposit 239 29.71 19.84 0.05 116.38 
Growth 239 1.13 2.81 -7.89 8.24 
Inflation 239 34.13 189.34 -18.78 2414.35 
Openness 239 0.62 0.30 0.13 2.16 
Control 239 0.61 0.27 0.00 1.00 
Education 239 95.49 20.70 25.00 148.67 
Property 239 4.46 1.30 1.58 7.06 
Natural resources 239 18.99 3.96 7.73 24.33 
Crisis 239 0.42 0.49 0.00 1.00 
Regulation 239 5.94 2.15 0.00 9.85 
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Appendix 2.3: Evolution of variables 
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Appendix 2.4: Illustration of Lucas paradox among developing countries 
 Dependent Variable: Private Capital per capita 
Explanatory Variables Fixed Effect 2SLS 
GDP per capita 0.065 0.061 
 (11.68)*** (6.43)*** 
Constant -5.301 -15.896 
 (0.46) (0.78) 
Observations 668 571 
Countries 106 106 
R² 0.25 0.29 
 t statistics in parentheses  
All regressions include time and country fixed effects. 
significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
The regression is based on a large sample of developing countries including the countries retained for the rest of the 
analysis. 
 
 
 
Appendix 2.5: Correlation between the main variables 
 FDI Portfolio I. Telephone Electricity M3/GDP Credit Deposit 
FDI 1       
Portfolio I. 0.0812   1      
Telephone 0.2401*  0.0587 1     
Electricity 0.3146*  0.2042* 0.6613* 1    
M3/GDP 0.1080*  0.1006* 0.3543* 0.2998* 1   
Credit -0.0276   0.2246* 0.2933* 0.4181* 0.7031*  1  
Deposit 0.1849*  0.1408* 0.4365* 0.4170* 0.9506*  0.7109*  1 
* significant at 1% 
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Appendix 2.6: Eigenvalue and variance with principal components analysis  
Principal 
components 
Eigenvalue Proportion of variance 
Cumulative 
Variance  
1 3.07 0.61 0.61 
2 1.19 0.24 0.85 
3 0.42 0.09 0.94 
4 0.27 0.05 0.99 
5 0.05 0.01 1.00 
 
 Eigenvectors 
Variable  1 2 3 4 5 
M3/GDP 0.50 -0.36 -0.31 -0.23 0.69 
Deposit 0.53 -0.25 -0.26 -0.28 -0.72 
Credit 0.47 -0.26 0.60 0.59 -0.01 
Telephone  0.34 0.63 -0.49 0.50 0.02 
Electricity 0.37 0.59 0.49 -0.52 0.09 
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Appendix 2.7: 2SLS Estimation with physical and financial infrastructure 
index 
 Dependent Variables 
Explanatory 
Variables 
Private 
capital 
FDI Portfolio I. Private 
capital 
FDI Portfolio I. 
Infrastructure1 0.541 0.327 0.191    
 (2.56)** (1.84)* (2.05)**    
Infrastructure2    0.283 0.207 0.071 
    (2.88)*** (2.50)** (1.63) 
Control -1.289 -1.051 -0.136 -1.222 -0.980 -0.137 
 (2.38)** (2.31)** (0.57) (2.28)** (2.18)** (0.58) 
Growth 0.193 0.166 0.054 0.189 0.171 0.046 
 (3.73)*** (3.92)*** (2.35)** (3.84)*** (4.25)*** (2.12)** 
Inflation -0.000 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 
 (0.80) (2.20)** (1.76)* (1.02) (2.28)** (1.48) 
Openness -0.716 -0.377 -0.564 -0.695 -0.590 -0.373 
 (0.69) (0.43) (1.24) (0.72) (0.73) (0.87) 
Education -0.004 -0.004 0.001 -0.002 -0.002 0.001 
 (0.33) (0.36) (0.18) (0.18) (0.22) (0.26) 
Property -0.041 -0.061 0.011 -0.035 -0.063 0.017 
 (0.41) (0.72) (0.25) (0.36) (0.76) (0.40) 
Natural 
resources 
-0.103 -0.084 0.010 -0.098 -0.078 0.010 
 (0.71) (0.69) (0.16) (0.68) (0.65) (0.16) 
Crisis -0.708  -0.195 -0.705  -0.192 
 (3.21)***  (2.01)** (3.25)***  (2.01)** 
R2 0.84 0.86 0.25 0.84 0.87 0.27 
Sargan Stat.  0.01 0.27 0.33 0.02 0.06 0.28 
(p-value) 0.95 0.60 0.57 0.89 0.80 0.59 
Observations 197 197 197 197 197 197 
Countries 45 45 45 45 45 45 
z statistics in parentheses. 
All regressions include time and country fixed effects. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
1 Infrastructure index by principal component analysis 
2 Infrastructure index by standardization. 
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Appendix 2.8: Sample for estimation 
Sub-Saharan Africa Latin America and 
Caribbean 
Asia 
Benin Argentina Algeria* 
Botswana Barbados Bangladesh  
Burundi Bolivia Egypt* 
Cameroon Brazil India 
Central African Republic Chile Indonesia 
Chad Colombia Iran  
Congo, Rep. Costa Rica Jordan 
Cote d’Ivoire Dominican Republic Malaysia 
Ghana Ecuador Oman  
Kenya El Salvador Pakistan 
Madagascar Guatemala Papua New Guinea 
Niger Honduras Philippines 
Nigeria Jamaica Sri Lanka 
Rwanda Mexico Syrian Arab Republic 
Senegal Nicaragua Thailand 
Sierra Leone Peru Turkey 
South Africa Trinidad and Tobago Tunisia* 
Tanzania Venezuela Vietnam 
Togo   
Uganda   
Zambia   
Zimbabwe   
*Three North African countries are considered in the group of Asian countries because of their similarity to Middle 
East countries more than to Sub-Sahara African countries. 
 
 
